Apology of Socrates | 2
I have said enough in my defence against the ﬁrst class of my accusers; I turn to the second class. They are headed by, that good man and true lover of his country, as he calls himself.
Against these, too, I must try to make a defence: – Let their aﬃdavit be read: it contains something of this kind:
It says that Socrates is a doer of evil, who corrupts the youth; and who does not believe in the gods of the state, but has other new divinities of his own.
Such is the charge; and now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer of evil, and corrupt the youth;
but I say, O men of Athens, that Meletus is a doer of evil, in that he pretends to be in earnest when he is only in jest, and is so eager to bring men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the smallest interest.
And the truth of this I will endeavour to prove to you.
Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you:
You think a great deal about the improvement of youth?
Yes, I do.
Tell the judges, then, who is their;
for you must know, as you have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is.
– Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say.
But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter?
Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is.
But that, my good sir, is not my meaning.
I want to know who the person is, who, in the ﬁrst place, knows the laws.
The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.
What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth?
Certainly they are.
What, all of them, or some only and not others?
All of them.
By the goddess Here, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the audience, – do they improve them?
Yes, they do.
And the senators?
Yes, the senators improve them.
But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?
– or do they too improve them?
They improve them.
Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you aﬃrm?
That is what I stoutly aﬃrm.
I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a question:
How about horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good?
Is not the exact opposite the truth?
One man is able to do them good, or at least not many; – the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them?
Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? Most assuredly it is; whether you and Anytus say yes or no.
Happy indeed would be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all the rest of the world were their improvers.
But you, Meletus, have suﬃciently shown that you never had a thought about the young: your carelessness is seen in your not caring about the very things which you bring against me.
And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question – by Zeus I will:
Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones?
Answer, friend, I say; the question is one which may be easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil?
And is there anyone who would rather be injured than beneﬁted by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to answer – does anyone like to be injured?
And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?
Intentionally, I say.
But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbours good, and the evil do them evil:
Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know
that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet I corrupt him, and intentionally, too – so you say, although neither I nor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you.
But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them unintentionally; and on either view of the case you lie:
If my oﬀence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional oﬀences:
you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me;
for if I had been better advised, I should have left oﬀ doing what I only did unintentionally – no doubt I should; but you would have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in this court, which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.
It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying, that Meletus has no care at all, great or small, about the matter.
But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am aﬃrmed to corrupt the young.
I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment,
that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead.
These are the lessons by which I corrupt the youth, as you say.
Yes, that I say emphatically.
Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean!
for I do not as yet understand whether you aﬃrm that I teach other men to acknowledge some gods, and therefore that I do believe in gods, and am not an entire atheist – this you do not lay to my charge,
– but only you say that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes – the charge is that they are diﬀerent gods.
Or, do you mean that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism?
I mean the latter – that you are a complete atheist.
What an extraordinary statement! Why do you think so, Meletus? Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, like other men?
I assure you, judges, that he does not:
for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth.
Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing:
and you have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them illiterate to such a degree as not to know that these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, which are full of them.
And so, forsooth, the youth are said to be taught them by Socrates, when there are not infrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre (price of admission one drachma at the most);
(Probably in allusion to Aristophanes who caricatured, and to Euripides who borrowed the notions of Anaxagoras, as well as to other dramatic poets.)
and they might pay their money, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father these extraordinary views. And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god?
I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.
Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty sure that you do not believe yourself.
I cannot help thinking, men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado.
Has he not compounded a riddle, thinking to try me? He said to himself:
– I shall see whether the wise Socrates will discover my facetious contradiction, or whether I shall be able to deceive him and the rest of them.
For he certainly does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if he said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them – but this is not like a person who is in earnest.
I should ask you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I must remind the audience of my request that they would not make a disturbance if I speak in my accustomed manner:
Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human beings?
...I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in ﬂute-playing, and not in ﬂute- players?
No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did.
But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritual and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?
How lucky I am to have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court!
But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual agencies,
– so you say and swear in the aﬃdavit;
and yet if I believe in divine beings, how can I help believing in spirits or demigods; – must I not? To be sure I must; and therefore I may assume that your silence gives consent.
Now what are spirits or demigods? Are they not either gods or the sons of gods?
Certainly they are.
But this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you:
the demigods or spirits are gods, and you say ﬁrst that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in demigods:
For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers, of whom they are said to be the sons – what human being will ever believe that there are no gods if they are the sons of gods?
You might as well aﬃrm the existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses.
Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been intended by you to make trial of me. You have put this into the indictment because you had nothing real of which to accuse me.
But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same men can believe in divine and superhuman things, and yet not believe that there are gods and demigods and heroes.
I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus:
any elaborate defence is unnecessary, but I know only too well how many are the enmities which I have incurred, and this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed:
– not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be the death of many more; there is no danger of my being the last of them.
Someone will say:
And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely end?
To him I may fairly answer:
There you are mistaken:
a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong – acting the part of a good man or of a bad.
Whereas, upon your view, the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much, and the son of Thetis above all, who altogether despised danger in comparison with disgrace;
and when he was so eager to slay Hector, his goddess mother said to him, that if he avenged his companion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would die himself
– ’Fate,’ she said, in these or the like words, ’waits for you next after Hector;’
he, receiving this warning, utterly despised danger and death, and instead of fearing them, feared rather to live in dishonour, and not to avenge his friend:
’Let me die forthwith,’ he replies, ’and be avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the beaked ships, a laughing-stock and a burden of the earth.’
Had Achilles any thought of death and danger?
For wherever a man’s place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should not think of death or of anything but of disgrace. And this, O men of Athens, is a true saying.
Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens,
if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death
– if now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulﬁl the philosopher’s mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear;
that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death, fancying that I was wise when I was not wise.
For the fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretence of knowing the unknown;
and no one knows whether death, which men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance which is the conceit that a man knows what he does not know?
And in this respect only I believe myself to diﬀer from men in general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than they are:
– that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know:
but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonourable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil.
And therefore if you let me go now, and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that since I had been prosecuted I must be put to death;
(or if not that I ought never to have been prosecuted at all); and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words
– if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and you shall be let oﬀ, but upon one condition, that you are not to enquire and speculate in this way anymore, and that if you are caught doing so again you shall die;
– if this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply:
Men of Athens, I honour and love you;
but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy,
exhorting anyone whom I meet and saying to him after my manner:
You, my friend, – a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, – are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money and honour and reputation,
and caring so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all?
And if the person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; then I do not leave him or let him go at once; but I proceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine him,
and if I think that he has no virtue in him, but only says that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less.
And I shall repeat the same words to everyone whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren.
For, know that this is the command of God; and I believe that no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God.
For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike,
not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but ﬁrst and chieﬂy to care about the greatest.
I tell you thatis not given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as well as private.
This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. But if any one says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth.
Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; but whichever you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.