Objections Answered | 3

3. War Is Consistent With Moral Law

Objection.

The precepts of the gospel are consistent with the moral law, or the eternal nature of things, which is forever the standard of right and wrong to all moral beings in the universe.

War has been prosecuted consistently with this rule of right and wrong. Therefore, war cannot be contrary to the precepts of the gospel.

Answer.

This is an objection founded on an indefinable something aside from divine precept.

Yet, as some terms in it have been much used in polemic divinity by men of eminent talents and piety, whose praise is in the churches, I think it neither proper nor modest to dissent from so high authority without offering some reasons.

I shall, therefore, make a few general observations on what is called the moral law, the eternal rule of right and wrong, or the nature of things – all of which phrases, I believe, have been occasionally used by eminent writers as conveying the same ideas.

I cannot agree with those who suppose that a moral law or nature of things exists independently of the will of God and is the common law of God and man:

It appears to me as inconsistent to suppose a law to exist without a lawgiver as to suppose a world to exist without a creator.

If God is the only eternal and independent Being in the universe, and if all things are the work of his power and goodness,

then the supposition that an eternal law exists independently of him appears to me to be absurd, as on this supposition there exists a law without a lawgiver and an effect without a cause.

If God is not the author of all things, then there must be more than one eternal cause of things.

To suppose that the reason and fitness of things independently of the will of God, either in his works, his providence, or word, can be a rule of man’s duty

appears to me as inconsistent as to suppose that men might institute divine worship from such fitness of things independently of the existence of God;

for the will of God to man seems as necessary to lay a foundation of moral obligation and to direct man’s obedience as the existence of God is necessary to lay a foundation of religious worship.

Should it be asked whether the laws of God are not founded on the eternal nature and fitness of things, I would answer that such a supposition appears to me no more reasonable than to suppose that his power is founded on the eternal capacity of things;

for the capacity of things has just as much reality and eternity in it to found the omnipotence of God upon, as the reason and nature of things have to found his infinite wisdom or justice upon.

I therefore dissent from all standards of moral obligation which are supposed to exist aside from, and independently of, the divine will; and fully agree with the Assembly’s Shorter Catechism, in the answer to this question:

“What is the duty which God requires of man?
The duty which God requires of man is obedience to his revealed will.”

Should it, however, be said that things do exist aside from the divine will, that it does not depend on the divine will, but on the nature of things, that two and two make four, or that a thing cannot be in motion and at rest at the same time,

it is by no means admitted that this order or constitution of things exists independently of God. Instead, it is believed to be as much the effect of his power and goodness as anything else.

And if God is not the author of all the laws both in the natural and moral world, it may reasonably be inquired, who is?

If God is the moral governor of the world, then all his laws over men, as moral beings, must be moral laws.

To make a distinction between the laws designed to regulate the moral conduct of men, and to call some of them moral and others by different names, seems to me unnecessary, since I find no such distinction in the Scriptures.

Because some of God’s laws were intended to be temporary, under certain circumstances, they were no less of a moral nature on that account; neither was it any less criminal to violate them.

As created things are in some respects constantly changing, and as the relations of things are often varied, so a law may be relatively right at one time and relatively wrong at another.

But as man is frail and short-sighted, and is incapable of seeing the end from the beginning, he is totally unable of himself to judge what is and what is not right. Hence, a revelation is necessary from God to direct his steps.

That there is a fitness of things and a standard of moral right and wrong cannot be denied,

but, instead of being founded in a supposed nature of things independent of God, it originates in the very nature and perfections of God himself, and can never be known by man any farther than the nature and perfections of God are known.

A standard of right and wrong independent of God, whether by the name of moral law or the nature of things, is what never has been and never can be intelligibly defined. It is like a form without dimensions, like a foundation resting on nothing.

It is, therefore, in my opinion, as extravagant to talk of an eternal nature of things, without reference to the laws of God, as it would be to talk of an eternal wisdom or an eternal omnipotence, independent of the existence of God.

But if the statement of the objector is meant only to imply a rule of right and wrong emanating from the nature and perfections of God, and coincident with his laws, then –

admitting the propriety of the terms moral law, the nature of things, etc. – the objection, if it proves anything, may prove quite too much for its advocates,

for under certain circumstances it has been consistent with this rule of moral right and wrong utterly to exterminate nations, to destroy men, women, and children, and show them no mercy.

Besides, the whole force of the objection rests on the supposition that no laws which have existed, and which were not contrary to the moral law, can be abrogated under the Christian dispensation or be inconsistent with the precepts of the gospel.

It must follow that whatever has been morally right and lawful for men to do must forever remain right and lawful to be done:

This is a necessary result from the premises; but no Christian can consistently subscribe to this. The premises must, therefore, be unsound and the objection of no force.

If literal sacrifices, slavery, and many other practices, which are totally abolished under the Christian dispensation, were not contrary to the moral law under the Old Testament economy, why may not the same be true of war?

Why may not the gospel forbid war as consistently as it can forbid slavery?