First Alcibiades | Plato | 2 part
First Alcibiades | Part 2 | Plato
SOCRATES: A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?
ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew anyone who did what was dishonourable and yet just?
ALCIBIADES: Never.
SOCRATES: All just things are honourable?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good?
ALCIBIADES: I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are evil.
SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: You mean in such a case as the following:
–In time of war, men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is courage?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one’s friends is honourable in one point of view, but evil in another?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And if honourable, then also good:
Will you consider now whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honourable?
Now is this courage good or evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose - good or evil?
ALCIBIADES: Good.
SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: What would you say of courage? At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage?
ALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward.
SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?
ALCIBIADES: I do.
SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, in as much as courage does a good work?
ALCIBIADES: I should.
SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Might we not describe their different effects as follows:
–You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is good and yet evil?
ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good.
ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy?
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And happiness is a good?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the good and the honourable are again identified.
ALCIBIADES: Manifestly.
SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not?
ALCIBIADES: Expedient.
SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just?
ALCIBIADES: Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honourably.
SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the good is expedient?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?
ALCIBIADES: I should infer so.
SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer?
ALCIBIADES: I must acknowledge it to be true.
SOCRATES: And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule anyone
who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just may be the evil?
ALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying.
Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants.
SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?
ALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not.
SOCRATES: Do you suppose that if someone were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants?
ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I should.
SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason - because you would know?
ALCIBIADES: I suppose so.
SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant?
ALCIBIADES: Very likely.
SOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is not that clear?
ALCIBIADES: I agree.
SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly he is.
SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?
ALCIBIADES: Tell me.
SOCRATES: The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you do not think that you know.
ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean?
SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the preparation of food.
ALCIBIADES: Very true.
SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to someone who understands the art?
ALCIBIADES: The latter.
SOCRATES: Or if you were on a voyage,
would you bewilder yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?
ALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot.
SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it?
ALCIBIADES: I imagine not.
SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge?
ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean?
SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they are ignorant?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of course, be those who know?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think that they know.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, only those.
SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters?
ALCIBIADES: By far.
SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient?
ALCIBIADES: There cannot be.
SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being ignorant you fancy that you know them?
ALCIBIADES: I fear that you are right.
SOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will:
My good friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind,
and of this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own argument;
wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated.
Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For, I might say the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of your guardian, Pericles.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the philosophers:
with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.
SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught you letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he liked wise.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same?
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic - master?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter.
ALCIBIADES: I agree.
SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making his sons wise?
ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter?
SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?
ALCIBIADES: Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him.
SOCRATES: But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you be as you are?
ALCIBIADES: I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him.
SOCRATES: But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of Pericles,
–as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and Callias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of Zeno,
for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minae (about 406 pounds sterling) to the increase of their wisdom and fame.
ALCIBIADES: I certainly never did hear of any one.
SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?
ALCIBIADES: With your aid, Socrates, I will.
And indeed, when I hear you speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I agree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite uneducated.
SOCRATES: What is the inference?
ALCIBIADES: Why, that if they were educated they would be trained athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and experience when he attacks them;
but now, as they have become politicians without any special training, why should I have the trouble of learning and practising?
For I know well that by the light of nature I shall get the better of them.
SOCRATES: My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your noble form and your high estate!
ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?
SOCRATES: I am grieved when I think of our mutual love.
ALCIBIADES: At what?
SOCRATES: At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is with people here.
ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there?
SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?
ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?
SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board?
Would you not, while acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence, rather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellow combatants?
You ought to be so far above these latter, that they will not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as inferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy;
this is the kind of superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean to accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state.
ALCIBIADES: That would certainly be my aim.
SOCRATES: Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are better than the soldiers;
and you need not, when you are their superior and have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the generals of the enemy.
ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?
ALCIBIADES: True enough.
SOCRATES: And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were your true rivals?
ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right.
SOCRATES: Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail - breeder and others like him, who manage our politics;
in whom, as the women would remark, you may still see the slaves’ cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and not to rule us.
To these, I say, you should look, and then you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in such a noble arena:
there is no reason why you should either learn what has to be learned, or practise what has to be practised, and only when thoroughly prepared enter on a political career.
ALCIBIADES: There, I think, Socrates, that you are right;
I do not suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really different from anybody else.
SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying.
ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider?
SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.
SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself?
ALCIBIADES: No, I shall be greatly benefited.
SOCRATES: And this is one very important respect in which that notion of yours is bad.
ALCIBIADES: True.
SOCRATES: In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false.
ALCIBIADES: How so?
SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races?
ALCIBIADES: Clearly in noble races.
SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well-bred most likely to be perfect in virtue?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent?
Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?
ALCIBIADES: Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!
SOCRATES: And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, son of Zeus.
But, for all that, we are far inferior to them:
For they are descended ‘from Zeus,’ through a line of kings - either kings of Argos and Lacedaemon,
or kings of Persia, a country which the descendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at various times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are;
whereas, we and our fathers were but private persons.
How ridiculous would you be thought if you were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes.
You should consider how inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other particulars. Did you never observe how great the property of the Spartan kings is?
And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers and watch over them, in order to preserve as far as possible the purity of the Heracleid blood.
Still greater is the difference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king. Such is the awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is needless.
And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia;
whereas, when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardly knew of the important event.
After the birth of the royal child, he is tended, not by a good - for - nothing woman - nurse, but by the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him,
and especially with the fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order that he may be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held in great honour.
And when the young prince is seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding - masters, and begins to go out hunting.
And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the wisest, another the most just, a third the most temperate, and a fourth the most valiant.
The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him also the duties of his royal office;
the second, who is the fairest, teaches him always to speak the truth;
the third, or most temperate, forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,–lord of himself first, and not a slave;
the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave of his who was past all other work.
I might enlarge on the nurture and education of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said.
I have only to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he has a lover who looks after him.
And if you cast an eye on the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the anointing with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own inferiority;
or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians - in all these respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them.
Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must reveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far short of theirs.
For no one here can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures.
But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas,
for during many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never going out,
as in the fable of Aesop the fox said to the lion, ‘The prints of the feet of those going in are distinct enough;’ but who ever saw the trace of money going out of Lacedaemon?
And therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that their kings are the richest of them,
for they have a larger share of these things, and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable.
Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and their kings.
Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up to the king (at Susa),
that he passed through a large tract of excellent land, extending for nearly a day’s journey, which the people of the country called the queen’s girdle, and another, which they called her veil;
and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments.
Now, I cannot help thinking to myself,
What if someone were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her,
There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty minae - and that will be more than the value - and she has a son who is possessed of a three - hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he has a mind to go to war with your son
- would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict?
‘He must rely,’ she would say to herself, ‘upon his training and wisdom - these are the things which Hellenes value.’
And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated,
and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says that he is well enough as he is,
would she not be amazed, and ask ‘On what, then, does the youth rely?’
And if we replied:
He relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you possess with those of her own people.
And I believe that even Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she too would be equally astonished.
But how disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies’ wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their assailants!
O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian inscription, ‘Know thyself’ - not the men whom you think, but these kings are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill.
And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more than any other man ever desired anything.