Epictetus (c. 50 – c. 135 AD) | Stoicism

Chapter XIII How everything may be performed to the divine acceptance. When a person inquired, how any one might eat to the divine acceptance; if he eats with justice, said Epictetus, and with gratitude, and fairly, and temperately, and decently, must he not also eat to the divine acceptance? And if you call for hot water and your servant does

Chapter XIV That all things are under the Divine supervision. When a person asked him, how any one might be convinced that his every act is under the supervision of God? Do not you think, said Epictetus, that all things are mutually connected and united? “I do.” Well; and do not you think, that things on earth feel the influence

Chapter XV What philosophy promises. When one consulted him, how he might persuade his brother to forbear treating him ill; — Philosophy, answered Epictetus, doth not promise to procure any outward good for man; otherwise it would admit something beyond its proper theme. For as the material of a carpenter is wood; of a statuary, brass; so of the art

Chapter XVI Of Providence. Be not surprised, if other animals have all things necessary to the body, ready provided for them, not only meat and drink, but lodging; if they want neither shoes, nor bedding, nor clothes; while we stand in need of all these. For they not being made for themselves, but for service, it was not fit that

Chapter XVII That the art of reasoning is necessary. Since it is Reason which shapes and regulates all other things, it ought not itself to be left in disorder. But by what shall it be regulated? Evidently, either by itself, or by something else. Well; either that too is Reason, or something else superior to Reason, which is impossible; and,

Chapter XVIII That we ought not to be angry with the erring. If what the philosophers say be true, that all men’s actions proceed from one source; that, as they assent, from a persuasion that a thing is so, and dissent, from a persuasion that it is not, and suspend their judgment, from a persuasion that it is uncertain; so,

Chapter XIX Of the bight treatment of tyrants. WHEN a person is possessed of some personal advantage, either real or imaginary, he will necessarily be puffed up with it, unless he has been well instructed. A tyrant openly says, “I am supreme over all.” And what can you bestow on me? Can you exempt my desires from disappointment? How should

Chapter XX In what manner reason contemplates itself. Every art, and every faculty, contemplates certain things as its principal objects. Whenever, therefore, it is of the same nature with the objects of its contemplation, it necessarily contemplates itself too. But, where it is of a different nature, it cannot contemplate itself. The art of shoemaking, for instance, is exercised upon

Chapter XXI. Of the desire of admiration. When one maintains his proper attitude in life, he does not long after externals. What would you have, O man? “I am contented, if my desires and aversions are conformable to nature; if I seek and shun that which I ought, and thus regulate my purposes, my efforts, and my opinions.” Why, then,

Chapter XXII Of general principles. The same general principles are common to all men, nor does one such principle contradict another. For which of us does not admit, that good is advantageous and eligible, and in all cases to he pursued and followed? Who does not admit that justice is fair and becoming? Where, then, arises the dispute? In adapting

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