Epictetus (c. 50 – c. 135 AD) | Stoicism

Chapter XXIII Against Epicurus. Even Epicurus is sensible that we are by nature sociable beings; but having once placed our good in the mere outward shell, he can say nothing afterwards inconsistent with that. For again, he strenuously maintains, that we ought not to admire, or accept, anything separated from the nature of good. And he is in the right

Chapter XXIV How we ought to struggle with difficulties. Difficulties are things that show what men are. For the future, in case of any difficulty, remember, that God, like a gymnastic trainer, has pitted you against a rough antagonist. For what end? That you may be an Olympic conqueror; and this cannot be without toil. No man, in my opinion,

Chapter XXV On the same subject. If these things are true; and if we are not stupid, or insincere, when we say, that the good or ill of man lies within his own will, and that all beside is nothing to us; why are we still troubled? Why do we still fear? What truly concerns us is in no one’s

Chapter XXVI What the rule of life is. As someone was reading hypothetical propositions, Epictetus remarked that it was a rule in these to admit whatever was in accordance with the hypothesis; but much more a rule in life, to do what was in accordance with nature. For, if we desire in every matter and on every occasion to conform

Chapter XXVII Of the varied appearances of things to the mind, and what means are at hand by which to regulate them. Appearances to the mind are of 4 kinds . Things either are what they appear to be; or they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not,

Chapter XXVIII That we ought not to be angry with mankind. What things are little, what great, among men. What is the cause of assent to anything? It’s appearing to be true. It is not possible, therefore, to assent to what appears to be not true. Why? Because it is the very nature of the understanding to agree to truth,

Chapter XXIX Of courage. The essence of good and evil is a certain disposition of the will. What are things outward then? Materials on which the will may act, in attaining its own good or evil. How, then, will it attain good? If it be not dazzled by its own materials; for right principles concerning these materials keep the will

Chapter XXX Weapons ready for difficult occasions. When you are going before any of the great, remember, that there is another, who sees from above, what passes, and whom you ought to please, rather than man. He, therefore, asks you: “In the schools, what did you use to call exile, and prison, and chains, and death, and calumny?” I? Indifferent

Epictetus | Discourses | Book 2 Book II | Index 1. That Courage is not inconsistent with Caution 2. Of Tranquillity 3. Concerning such as recommend Persons to the Philosophers! 4. Concerning a Man who had been guilty of Adultery. 5. How Nobleness of Mind may be consistent with Prudence. 6. Of Circumstances, 7. Of Divination. 8. Wherein consists the

BOOK II Chapter I That courage is not inconsistent with caution. There is an assertion of the philosophers which may perhaps appear a paradox to many; yet let us fairly examine whether it be true: —that it is possible in all things, to act at once with caution and courage. For caution seems, in some measure, contrary to courage; and

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