Three Dialogues | George Berkeley | 3 - 1

Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,
in opposition to sceptics and atheists
George Berkeley (1685-1753)

THE THIRD DIALOGUE - Part 1

PHILONOUS. Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's meditation?

Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting? or have you since seen cause to change your opinion?

HYLAS. Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and uncertain. What we approve today, we condemn tomorrow.

We keep a stir about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas! -  we know nothing all the while:

nor do I think it possible for us ever to know anything in this life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended us for speculation.

PHIL. What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?

HYL. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

PHIL. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?

HYL. You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid;

but this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense.

Their internal constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly in the dark as to that.

PHIL. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?

HYL. Know? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it.

All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone?

I tell you that colour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real natures of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said of all other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the world.

They have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

PHIL. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

HYL. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own ideas.

That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and have no absolute existence in nature.

And in pretending to distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of a different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.

PHIL. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

HYL. Even so.

PHIL. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses?

And yet I know not how it is, but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life, as comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they are conversant about.

HYL. They do so:

but you know ordinary practice does not require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life.

But philosophers know better things.

PHIL. You mean, they know that they Know Nothing.

HYL. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

PHIL. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world?

Suppose you are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

HYL. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I declare positively I know not.

And the same is true with regard to every other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of things, but even of their existence.

It cannot be denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist.

Nay, now I think on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that it is impossible any real corporeal thing should exist in nature.

PHIL. You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the notions you now maintain:

and is it not evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of Material Substance? This makes you dream of those unknown natures in everything.

It is this occasions your distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well.

Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the true nature of everything, but you know not whether anything really exists, or whether there are any true natures at all;

forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence, wherein you suppose their reality consists.

And, as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or nothing at all,

it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real existence of any part of the universe.

And so you are plunged into the deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was. Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I say?

HYL. I agree with you. Material Substance was no more than an hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my breath in defence of it.

But whatever hypothesis you advance, or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you upon it.

That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.

PHIL. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them.

To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses.

These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings.

A piece of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of.

It is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and fire hot.

You indeed, who by snow and fire mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in them.

But I, who understand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to think like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their existence.

That a thing should be really perceived by my senses, and at the same time not really exist, is to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived.

Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse of, are things that I know.

And I should not have known them but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived;

and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in being perceived;

when, therefore, they are actually perceived there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts.

What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he has it proved to him from the veracity of God; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration!

I might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel.

HYL. Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible things should exist without the mind. Do you not?

PHIL. I do.

HYL. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist?

PHIL. I can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds.

Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it.

There is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation.

And, as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows there is an Omnipresent Eternal Mind, which knows and comprehends all things,

and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself has ordained, and are by us termed the Laws of Nature.

HYL. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or have they any agency included in them?

PHIL. They are altogether passive and inert.

HYL. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?

PHIL. I acknowledge it.

HYL. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of God?

PHIL. It cannot.

HYL. Since therefore you have no Idea of the mind of God, how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind?

Or, if you can conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it?

PHIL. As to your first question:

I own I have properly no Idea, either of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are.

I do nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist.

Farther, I know what I mean by the terms I and Myself; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound.

The Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives.

I say indivisible, because unextended; and unextended, because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea.

Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea.

However, taking the word idea in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is, an image or likeness of God—though indeed extremely inadequate.

For, all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections.

I have, therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in Myself some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflexion and reasoning.

My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas.

Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created things in the mind of God.

So much for your first question. For the second:

I suppose by this time you can answer it yourself:

For you neither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act, neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other; nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately.

All which makes the case of Matter widely different from that of the Deity.

HYL. You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no Idea of your own soul.

You even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit.

You admit nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because you have no notion or idea of it.

Is this fair dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this?

PHIL. I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of material substance, merely because I have no notion of it' but because the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it.

Many things, for aught I know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man has or can have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that is, nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition.

I say, secondly, that, although we believe things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists, without some reason for such belief:

but I have no reason for believing the existence of Matter.

I have no immediate intuition thereof:

neither can I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance—either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence.

Whereas the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflexion.

You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer to the same objections:

In the very notion or definition of Material Substance, there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit.

That ideas should exist in what does not perceive, or be produced by what does not act, is repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them.

It is granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances:

if to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there is a probability for the other;

if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter.

I say, lastly, that I have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of it. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by reflexion.

HYL. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that You are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them.

Words are not to be used without a meaning.

And, as there is no more meaning in Spiritual Substance than in Material Substance, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.

PHIL. How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own being;

and that I Myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas.

I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours and sounds:

that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour:

that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas.

But, I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of Matter:

On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency.

Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas.

But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance has inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas.

There is therefore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.

HYL. I own myself satisfied in this point.

But, do you in earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them?

Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, to be perceived is one thing, and to exist is another.

PHIL. I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world for the truth of my notion.

Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses.

Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it.

What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real, being, and says it is or exists; but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he says, has no being.

HYL. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.

PHIL. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us.

HYL. But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men:

Ask the fellow whether yonder tree has an existence out of his mind:
what answer think you he would make?

PHIL. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it does exist out of his mind.

But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that is exists in) the infinite mind of God.

Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is.

But the point itself he cannot deny.

The question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a Real existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an Absolute existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds.

This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.

HYL. But, according to your notions, what difference is there between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream—since they are all equally in the mind?

PHIL. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they have, besides, an entire dependence on the will.

But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like dependence on our will.

There is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused.

And, though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from realities.

In short, by whatever method you distinguish things from chimeras on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

HYL. But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but spirits and ideas. And this, you must acknowledge, sounds very oddly.

PHIL. I own the word Idea, not being commonly used for Thing, sounds something out of the way.

My reason for using it was, because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that term; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding.

But, however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its sense;

which in effect amounts to no more than this,

to wit, that there are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind;

if not by a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom "we live, and move, and have our being."

Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not on the objects:

or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things, or know anything of their real natures—though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all our senses?

HYL. And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature?

Can there be anything more extravagant than this?

PHIL. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say

—a thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions, without any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom,

Nothing can give to another that which it has not itself.

Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places:

In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle.

This is so much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to confirm it by citations.

HYL. You are not aware, Philonous, that in making God the immediate Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.

PHIL. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an instrument.

In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument or occasion, called Matter, you as truly make Him the author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature.

I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude does not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion.

This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder.

Since, therefore, sin does not consist in the physical action, the making God an immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin.

Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies.

It is true I have denied there are any other agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings, in the production of motions,

the use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions.