23. Inapplicability of the principles proposed to the purposes of life
After the defensibility of war has been proved, or assumed, in the manner that we have exhibited, Dr. Paley states the occasions upon which he determines that wars become justifiable.
“The objects of just wars,” says he, “are precaution, defence, or reparation… Every just war supposes an injury perpetrated, attempted, or feared.”
I shall acknowledge that, if these are justifying motives to war, I see very little purpose in talking of morality upon the subject.
It was wise to leave the principles of Christianity out of the question, and to pass them by unnoticed, if they were to be succeeded by principles like these:
It is in vain to expatiate on moral obligations if we are at liberty to declare war whenever an “injury is feared.” An injury, without limit to its insignificance! A fear, without stipulation for its reasonableness!
Also, the judges of the reasonableness of fear are to be they who are under its influence, and who are so likely to judge amiss as those who are afraid?
Sounder philosophy than this has told us that “he who has to reason upon his duty when the temptation to transgress it is before him is almost sure to reason himself into an error.”
The necessity for this ill-timed reasoning, and the allowance of it, is among the capital objections to the philosophy of Paley:
It tells us that a people may suspend the laws of God when they think it is “expedient,” and they are to judge of this expediency when the temptation to transgression is before them!
Has Christianity left the lawfulness of human destruction to be determined on such principles as these?
Violence, rapine, and ambition are not to be restrained by morality like this:
It may serve for the speculation of a study, but we will venture to affirm that mankind will never be controlled by it. Moral rules are useless if, from their own nature, they cannot be, or will not be applied.
Who believes that if kings and conquerors may fight when they have fears, they will not fight when they have them not?
The morality allows too much latitude to the passions to retain any practical restraint upon them:
And a morality that will not be practiced, I had almost said that cannot be practiced, is a useless morality. It is a theory of morals. We want clearer and more exclusive rules. We want more obvious and immediate sanctions.
It is in vain for a philosopher to say to a general who is burning for glory:
“You are at liberty to engage in the war provided you have suffered, or fear you will suffer, an injury. Otherwise, Christianity prohibits it.”
He will tell him of twenty injuries that have been suffered, of a hundred that have been attempted, and of ten thousand that he fears. And what answer can the philosopher make to him?